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One prominent factor associated with accepting science as factual includes 
religiosity, with greater espoused religiosity often associated with less acceptance of 
scientific facts and greater secularism associated with greater acceptance of science as 
factual, but often reduced respect of religious beliefs. Such dichotomies exacerbate 
perceptions that science and religion are mutually exclusive, thereby fostering conflict 
between individuals with different perspectives and increasing ideological polarization. 
The current study sought to compare these mutually exclusive articulations of science and 
religion to a mutualist articulation of science and religion as complementary ways of 
knowing. Participants were randomly assigned to read one of four condition vignettes: a 
portrayal of science as superior to religion in terms of generating “true” knowledge, 
religion as superior to science in terms of generating “true” knowledge, a mutualistic 
perspective indicating that science and religion complement each other and are valuable 
ways of learning truth more broadly, or an unrelated control condition. Participants then 
rated the extent to which they agreed that certain scientific facts were true and their 
respect for commonly held religious beliefs, followed by a measure assessing their 
general belief in science versus religion. This was followed by an assessment of their 
perception of vignette authors’ expertise, their own political orientation, and self-reported 
religiosity, with the former two variables’ influence accounted for in omnibus models. 
Consistent with previous research, more religious individuals reported lower endorsement 
of scientific facts. When testing levels of religious respect, more conservative individuals, 
as well as those reporting higher levels of religiosity, reported higher levels of respect for 
religious practices. Consistent with hypotheses, participants low in religiosity within the 
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mutuality condition reported greater respect for religious practices compared to all other 
conditions. Partially supporting reactance hypotheses, low religiosity individuals exposed 
to the religion-superiority condition expressed greater belief in science compared to the 
mutuality condition, reflecting potential defensive reactance. These results highlight 
mutuality as an effective strategy to increase secular individuals’ respect for religion; 
however, high religiosity persons were un-swayed by this mutualistic articulation of 
science and religion. 
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CHAPTER I - INTRODUCTION 
One significant challenge facing the scientific community today is decreasing 
trust in the enterprise of science and declining belief in scientific findings as fact by the 
public (Rutjens, Heine, Sutton, & van Harreveld, 2018; Tsipursky, 2018). The 
consequences of declining trust in science are notable, and include trends such as repeal 
of policies and participation in multi-national agreements to counter climate change 
through reduced carbon emissions and support for alternative energy sources, as well as 
anti-vaccination movements that have resulted in the resurgence of previously eradicated 
diseases, such as measles (Hackett, 2019). Historically, society has benefited from 
“buying” into the work of scientists and the recommendations from the outcomes of 
scientific research, which include a litany of social, technological, and medical 
developments that have improved outcomes and opportunities for people in society 
(Maqbool, Bahadar, & Abdollahi, 2014). However, when public trust in science declines, 
the ability of science to provide social beneficence is impeded, and this ultimately results 
in negative outcomes for society and its individual members. 
As a consequence of recent trends, the scientific community has become 
increasingly interested in understanding the factors contributing to reduced acceptance of 
scientific evidence, primarily as means of identifying strategies to effectively enhance 
public trust in science. The increase in science denial has co-evolved with another 
society-wide phenomenon; increased access to information (Lewandowsky, Mann, 
Brown, & Friedman, 2016). This increased informational access would be expected to 
result in an increase trust in science as greater informational awareness often reduces 
unwarranted skepticism. However, it would appear that a decrease in trust of scientific 
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information has resulted instead (Tsipursky, 2018). In explaining this inverse relationship 
between information availability and public trust in science, it may be that access to vast 
quantities of unfiltered information itself might be part of the problem (Andrejevic, 2013; 
Malhotra, 1984; Marchi, 2012). While the ability to communicate so broadly can 
positively impact understanding of other cultures and ideas, it can be hard to navigate the 
rapid influx of information to the point where individuals may not be able to differentiate 
truth from falsehood (Allcott & Gentzow, 2017). When flooded by information, with no 
way to appropriately filter through it, individuals may take the less costly cognitive route 
by simply accepting information that confirms, or is consistent with, their own world 
view. 
Another way that individuals may reduce the overwhelming amount of 
information is to trust information based on its source. Specifically, individuals may look 
to people they consider to be experts and base their own opinion on the expert’s. Indeed, 
perceived expertise has been shown to be related to attitudes regarding various types of 
information (Cairney & Wellstead, 2020; Stecula, Kuru, & Jamieson, 2020; Tokushige, 
Akimoto, Tomoda, 2007). Examples of this can be seen in the evolving definition of 
“expert”, which has begun to include individuals that the public considers to have high 
levels of expertise in a particular topic, despite these individuals having no qualifications 
relating to that topic. For example, peoples’ trust in conspiracy theories created by 
“experts”, though derived from non-scientific information, are able to influence peoples’ 





Confirmation Bias and Reactance 
Confirmation bias, defined as the tendency for people to consider only 
information that supports their current worldview as being accurate, influences peoples’ 
information processing (Wason, 1960). Specifically, confirmation bias is a heuristic with 
the purpose of efficiently, rather than carefully, processing information. When exposed to 
information that contradicts (threatens) their world view, individuals tend to develop a 
more negative attitude toward the contradictory information and double down on their 
beliefs, whether or not they are accurate (e.g., disconfirmation of incompatible 
information). For example, previous research has found that participants were more likely 
to evaluate a hypothesis with implications contrary to their own self-concepts as less 
valid (reactance due to confirmation bias) than participants who did not evaluate a 
threatening hypothesis (Munro & Stansbury, 2009). 
Subsequent research examined methods for reducing confirmation bias in 
participants. Specifically, one study suggested that when given information in a disfluent 
format (e.g., in a strange or difficult-to-read font), participants were forced to spend more 
time processing the information (Hernandez & Preston, 2012). This resulted in a decrease 
in confirmation bias when participants were processing information inconsistent with 
their world view. The authors suggest that the greater time required to process the 
threatening information resulted in a more detailed and analytical processing of that 
information, removing participants’ ability to simply disregard it despite its 
disconfirmatory nature (Hernandez & Preston, 2012). 
Research on reactive responses and confirmation bias demonstrate how 
information delivered in a non-compromising fashion, with a vested interest (e.g., 
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“religion is useless”), rather than in a more open way suggesting the availability of 
alternatives (e.g., “religion may not be helpful in this context, but it can be useful here”), 
is more likely to receive a reactionary response from the partner in the interaction 
(Brehm, 1966; Steindl, Jonas, Sittenthaler, Traut-Mattausch, & Greenberg, 2015). For 
example, participants tasked with engaging in a hypothetical doctor-patient interaction 
were found to react with mistrust and confirmation bias, particularly the patients, with 
their interaction partner when given a forced medication (e.g., when the doctor pursued a 
personal interest at the patient’s expense; Steindl & Jonas, 2015). This style of interaction 
resulted in greater patient reactivity which, in turn, resulted in more frequent subtle 
displays of reactivity and confirmation bias from the doctors, who would then search for 
information that supported their forced medication preference. Additionally, the 
aggressive behavior intentions of the participants increased in the forced medication 
condition.  
These findings suggest that polarization can result from absolutist language (or 
decisions) that neither acknowledges nor validates inconsistent information, as is seen in 
the derogation of science by some religious extremists as well as the derogation of 
religion by atheist extremists. In reaction to this absolutism, polarization between groups 
increases, along with confirmation biases and intention to engage in aggressive behaviors 
towards members of the other group. These aggressive reactions can range from fiery 
arguments online to public protests that can turn violent without offering any real 
solution to the polarization that motivated the protest behavior in the first place. 
Confirmation biases can also manifest in other dangerous ways, such as religious denial 
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of the benefits of medical advancements (e.g., religious exemptions to vaccination; 
Committee on Bioethics, 1997). 
Individual Difference Factors Influencing Scientific Belief 
Previous research has found that individual difference factors, such as individual 
ideologies, are related to individuals’ attitudes towards scientific information (e.g., 
Rutjens, Sutton, & van der Lee, 2018). For example, political orientation has been found 
to be related to self-reported belief in scientific findings, with politically conservative 
individuals reporting greater disagreement with science compared to more liberal 
individuals (Gauchat, 2012; McCright, 2011; Medlin, Sacco, & Brown, 2019). Indeed, 
increased propagation of misinformation has already been demonstrated by political 
conservatives during major societal events (i.e., the 2016 U.S. presidential election; 
Allcott & Gentzow, 2017; Pfattheicher & Schindler, 2016). 
These political differences in science belief suggest that there might be 
differences in information processing between individuals of varying political 
orientations (Rutjens, Sutton, & van der Lee, 2018). Individuals more liberal in 
orientation may approach new information openly, as liberals tend to be higher in the 
personality trait of openness to experience compared to conservative individuals, which 
can result in greater trust of scientific findings, particularly those findings that may run 
counter to one’s previously held beliefs (Carney, Jost, Gosling, & Potter, 2008). 
However, such openness, though it buffers against maladaptive skepticism, also renders 
liberals more vulnerable to misinformation especially when it is expressed to impress 
rather than convey truthful information (Medlin et al., 2019; Nilsson, Erlandsson, & 
Västfjäll, 2019). Conversely, conservative individuals may avoid such information in 
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favor of information that aligns with their beliefs and avoidance of disconfirmatory 
information (Jost, 2006; Leone & Chirumbolo, 2012; Nilsson, Erlandsson, &Västfjäll, 
2019; Roccas, Sagiv, Schwarz, & Knfao, 2002).   
Religious attitudes towards science 
More pertinent to the current study, religious belief is another factor that can 
influence an individual’s attitudes towards science (Evans & Hudson, 2007; Parrott, Silk, 
Krieger, Harris, & Condit, 2004). While highly religious individuals are more likely to be 
politically conservative, not all conservatives are religious (Clobert & Saroglou, 2015). 
Therefore, religiosity as a psychological construct has unique features, independent of 
any shared variance with political ideology, and thus is distinct enough to be considered a 
unique individual difference characteristic (Clobert & Saroglou, 2015).  
There are many aspects of science that religious individuals are particularly 
averse to, such as evolutionary research and controversial medical advancements (e.g., 
abortion, cloning, and stem cell research; Bainbridge, 2003; McPhetres & Zuckerman, 
2018; Nisbet, 2005). Indeed, it has been argued that religious persons are highly opposed 
to science in specific domains where they believe scientists are tampering with God’s 
domain (e.g., creating life; Bainbridge, 2003) and that there are certain metaphysical 
questions that science is not qualified to answer (e.g., origins of human life, when a life 
begins). Disagreements regarding scientific research areas could occur when religious 
individuals feel that scientists are making claims that go beyond the realm of science 
(e.g., metaphysical topics; McPhetres & Nyugen, 2017). This is particularly common 
when a small subset of unqualified individuals claiming to be scientists say that science is 
able to prove religion wrong (Francis, Astley, & McKenna, 2019). To claim that science 
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can establish that religion is wrong reflects an inaccurate understanding of the scientific 
method, as such a position is currently not falsifiable, which is a critical requirement for 
sound scientific research (Ding, 2002; Popper, 1963). The resulting distrust of absolutist 
scientists may then be more easily generalized to science more broadly, fostering 
reactance and dismissal of the scientific enterprise, including science with socially 
beneficial results (e.g., effectiveness of vaccinations).  
Defensive Reactivity 
Events that call personally held beliefs into question, prompting feelings of 
uncertainty, result in utilization of uncertainty reduction techniques including defensive 
reactivity McGregor, Zanna, Holmes, & Spencer, 2001; Nash, McGregor, & Prentice, 
2011; Wichman, 2010). Defensive reactivity refers to the tendency of an individual to 
react with negative emotions to a perceived threat. This may be a physical threat or a 
figurative threat, such as a threat to an individual’s worldview. An individual’s reactivity 
to perceived threat often leads to strengthened belief in personally relevant information 
and values (e.g., attitudes towards abortion and gun control; Lewandowsky et al., 2016; 
McGregor, Zanna, Holmes, & Spencer, 2001). 
These types of defensive responses have been documented with respect to 
scientists and religious individuals in social and news media, each of which are reacting 
in a self-defensive manner against what they consider to be systematic threats posed by 
inferior outside parties intent on undermining their worldview or way of knowing (i.e., 
the other sides’ faulty belief system; Howell, 2019). With the vastness of the internet, it is 
possible to make unfounded claims with anonymity, removing the burden of proof or 
responsibility. Technological advances in social media have given individuals the ability 
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to say whatever they want, whether it is factual or not, without any repercussions. With 
this lack of personal responsibility, defensive reactivity over social media has increased 
(Xia, 2013). Emotionally charged Facebook rants, news channels sensationalizing 
disagreements between polarized groups (e.g., religion and science) with data “backed 
up” by scientist-administrated polls, and falsified data making medical claims not 
supported by the medical and scientific community are all formats in which 
misinformation can be widely spread, leading to the potential acceptance of inaccurate, 
dangerous beliefs (Khaldarova & Pantti, 2016; Marchi, 2012). 
Interestingly, Pew Research Polls on religious trends show a noticeable decline in 
self-identified religiosity and participation in religion in the US (Pew Research Forum, 
2015; 2018; 2019). Religious extremists’ demonizing of scientific research could be 
contributing to this, as well as their assertion that religion supersedes science. Another 
reason for this decline may involve religious reactionary aggression towards scientific 
research related specifically to women’s rights, resulting in a denial of those rights (e.g., 
the right to an abortion; O’Brien & Noy, 2015). This decline in self-reported religiosity 
suggests that there is a rapidly growing contingent in the U.S. that feels uncomfortable 
with the rigidity inherent in traditional religiosity (Djupe, Neiheisel, & Conger, 2018).  
Perceptions of religion as unduly rigid (conservativism/dogmatism) have also 
been on the rise in Europe, as it steadily becomes more secularized. Non-religious 
individuals in Belgium, for example, reported that religious individuals were more likely 
to attribute negative traits to them compared to religious individuals’ actual attitudes 
(stereotypes) towards non-religious individuals (Saroglou, Yzerbyt, & Kaschten, 2011). It 
is likely that this perceived hostility from religious individuals also increased in-group 
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bias within non-religious individuals, which was significantly higher than it was for 
religious individuals. Additionally, non-religious individuals’ evaluations of religious 
individuals were significantly lower than religious individuals’ evaluations of non-
religious individuals. 
This evaluation of religious people as more judgmental than they actually are may 
be related to increased rates of reactive hostility from non-religious/atheist individuals 
that manifest on social platforms where they decry religious “anti-science” attitudes. One 
post in particular, written by an ecological and evolutionary scientist, denounced 
religious faith as a defect while arguing that religion and science are, by definition, 
irreconcilable (Coyne, 2018). Religion and science, while different methods of perceiving 
the world, both still serve valuable functions within human society. The dramatic derision 
from the fanatically religious and skeptical do not consider the benefits the other side has 
to offer, resulting in attitudes of invalidation and rejection from both sides. 
Further, the tendency for media outlets to speak about topics related to science 
and religion in biased ways further sensationalize the issues, encouraging arguments 
between the two increasingly polarized groups (Hmielowski, Feldman, Myers, 
Leiserowitz, & Maibach, 2014). Additionally, the anonymity afforded by internet 
platforms makes people feel comfortable to react rudely to an individual’s differing 
viewpoint, degrading conversations into petty arguments, further polarizing the two sides 
(Holt, 2016). 
The consequence of this spread is an ever-increasing polarization between the 
religious and scientific communities, similar to that seen in the participants, doctors and 
patients, in Steindl and Jonas’ (2015) study. Recent political policies serve as an example 
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of this growing fissure between science and religion. For example, the dramatic budget 
cuts for the Environmental Protection Agency (E.P.A.) proposed by Trump, a former 
president who touted religious morals, demonstrates the lack of acknowledgment of the 
large body of scientific research showing the need for greater concern regarding the 
climate change crisis by the Trump administration and their constituents (Thrush & 
Davenport, 2017).  
Not only did the Trump administration basically deny climate change as being a 
serious issue, they removed scientific data regarding climate change issues from websites 
and governmental databases (Diamond, 2020; Rainey & Rainey, 2017). This dismissal of 
scientific evidence has resulted in defensive reactions from supporters of scientific 
research who protested against the Trump administrations’ anti-science platform (Fisher 
& Frickel, 2018). Compromise between the scientific and religious camps is critical if the 
public is to continue to benefit from both scientific discoveries and social institutions 
intended to foster meaning and social support, the latter often facilitated by participation 
in religious and spiritual communities. 
Mutuality as a Counter to Polarization 
In an increasingly polarized climate, pitting religion and science as purely 
oppositional, it is imperative to work towards a compromise between scientific 
foundations and the members of the majority religion in the US; Christians. This research 
proposes a method by which to introduce a compromise by educating both secular and 
religious individuals about the mutualistic nature of science and religion. Indeed, much 
past research suggests that mutuality can foster greater acceptance of differing views and 
respect for those views even when adoption of those views is not necessarily possible.   
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Mutuality has been found to be beneficial in both cultural and interpersonal 
contexts (Curseu, Schruijer, & Fodor, 2017; Horenczyk, Jasinskaja-Lahti, Sam, & 
Vedder, 2013). For instance, within the context of acculturation, which is when members 
of one culture integrate into another culture as a cultural minority, a minority group takes 
on some of the social norms of the culture into which they are integrating (Horenczyk et 
al., 2013). In turn, the majority is more likely to accept cultural deviations within the 
minority culture, such as a different major religion, hierarchy, etc., provided they do not 
violate the major beliefs of the dominant culture. 
Additionally, mutuality has been found to be beneficial on the individual level 
(Lester, Goodloe, Johnson, & Deutsch, 2018). The emphasis of mutuality on interest in 
engaging with others, as well as experiential empathy, has made it very effective in youth 
mentoring programs as well as in couples therapy. Within mentor-mentee programs, 
mutuality is promoted between the mentor and mentee by enhancing an interest in 
investing in the relationship as well as normalizing the mentee’s experience through the 
mentor’s sharing of common experiences. 
Taken together, past research suggests that mutuality has the ability to close gaps 
between peoples of differing values and attitudes on both individual and cultural levels. 
Not only has it been effective in fostering understanding between individuals of diverse 
cultural backgrounds, as well as mentor-mentee programs, mutuality has also been 
effective in therapeutic settings between couples and therapists (Skerrett, 1996). 
Critically, mutuality is effective because it closes the initial gap between two perspectives 
by fostering changes in both perspectives, rather than unilaterally requiring change from 
only one party (Curseu et al., 2017). In essence, this is a critical dimension of mutuality 
 
12 
because one side is not asked to endure more of the burden associated with compromise 
than the other. Furthermore, both parties may be more likely to be exposed to validation 
of an opposing belief system by a potentially respected in-group member (e.g., majority 
leaders demonstrating respect for, and commonality - social cohesion - with, minority 
groups; Glasford & Johnston, 2017). Being exposed to an in-group member espousing 
respect for an out-group member’s worldview can be a means of fostering greater respect 
for this oppositional position (also seen in racial discrimination and learning research, 
e.g., Branscombe, Schmitt, & Harvey, 1999; Curseu et al., 2017). 
Given the positive impact mutuality has been shown to have on group 
cohesiveness, I expected that leveraging mutuality in the context of two seemingly 
oppositional ways of knowing, specifically science and religion, with largely separate 
populations of individuals, may lead to positive attitudinal changes in both groups. I 
utilized mutuality to emphasize the areas in which scientists are qualified to serve as 
experts, the areas where religion offers valuable input, and communicate that both can 
accomplish their goals in a non-competitive, mutually beneficial way. Both parties need 
to recognize the limitations of what science and religion can answer while respecting the 
unique information that each can produce. In essence, such mutualism should promote 1) 
appreciation for the unique insights provided by both epistemologies, 2) appreciation for 
the limitations of both epistemologies, and 3) awareness of the benefits of valuing and 
respecting both ways of knowing the world and attempting to obtain truth. 
Current Research 
The purpose of the current research was to determine the effectiveness of 
mutualistic exposure aimed at improving religious persons’ acceptance of science 
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towards valid scientific research while also fostering respect for religious practices 
amongst secular persons who may feel that believing in god serves no function. 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of four informational conditions manipulated 
via exposure to different vignettes: a condition in which science is communicated as 
superior to religion in terms of generating factual information, a condition in which 
religion is superior to science in generating factual information, a science-and-religion-
are-complimentary condition (i.e., each is a valuable way of knowing that uniquely and 
collaboratively produce valued ways of understanding truth), or an unrelated control 
vignette, added to test the effectiveness of participants’ exposure to mutuality. 
Participants were asked to read each vignette carefully, as they would be asked a question 
about it once they finished. Participants then completed assessments of vignette authors’ 
expertise, belief in scientific facts, respect for religious beliefs, self-reported religiosity, 
perceived expertise of vignette authors, and political orientation.  Given past research 
showing a modest correlation between religiosity and political orientation as well as the 
possibility that perceived expertise may vary as a function of how consistent the vignette 
perspective is with one’s own personal beliefs (Clobert & Saroglou, 2015; Frimer, 
Gaucher, & Schaefer, 2014), these two variables were included in the omnibus model as 
control variables to determine the independent impact of self-reported religiosity and 
vignette condition on dependent measures in order to test core study hypotheses. In 
addition, affective measures for fear and hostility were included within analyses to 




It was predicted that religiosity would interact with communication type (e.g., 
religious individuals would react negatively to the science as superior condition). For 
individuals reporting higher levels of religious belief, the science is superior condition 
would lead to especially high skepticism of science (reactance) and particularly strong 
support of religious belief, with the religion as superior condition showing a similar, 
though less intense, pattern. The mutuality condition was not expected to differ in support 
for religion compared to the religion is superior condition, but would result in greater 
belief in scientific facts than the other three conditions for individuals high in religiosity. 
Additionally, individuals high in religiosity within the control condition were expected to 
report higher levels of  fact belief compared to the science is superior and religion is 
superior conditions, but lower fact belief compared to the mutuality condition. For 
individuals reporting lower levels of religious belief, the religion is superior condition 
was expected to lead to increased disrespect towards religious belief (reactance) and 
particularly strong support of science, with the science is superior condition showing a 
similar, though slightly weaker, pattern. The mutuality condition, again, will not differ in 
support for science compared to the science as superior condition, but will result in 
greater respect for religion than the other three conditions for individuals low in 
religiosity (high in secularism). Additionally, individuals reporting lower levels of 
religiosity within the control condition  were expected to report higher levels of  religious 
respect compared to the science is superior and religion is superior conditions, but lower 
religious respect compared to the mutuality condition.  
 Given that the control condition did not contain information regarding either 
religion or science viewpoints, participants’ support for science in this condition was 
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expected to be higher than in the religion is superior condition but lower than in the 
mutuality and science as superior conditions. Finally, control condition participants’ 
belief in religion was expected to be lower than in the religion as superior condition but 
higher than in the science as superior and mutuality conditions.
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CHAPTER II - METHODS 
Study Design 
The design utilized in this study included one between-factor variable with four 
levels; Science as superior, Religion as superior, the Mutuality condition, and a control 
condition. Primary dependent measures included personal acceptance of a series of 
known scientific facts, respect for a series of common religious beliefs and practices, 
belief in science, and belief in religion. 
Participants 
Participants were recruited from a mid-sized public university in Southeastern 
U.S. participated for course credit. A small-medium effect-size power analysis (Cohen’s 
f=0.20, β=0.80) indicated that 244 participants would sufficiently detect effects. I 
deliberately oversampled by 10% to account for attrition. The final sample size consisted 
of 272 participants, after excluding two for incomplete responses (235 Women, 35 Men, 
2 “Other”; Mage=21.01, SDage=5.99; 178 White, 75 Black, 6 Hispanic or Latino, 5 Asian, 
8 “Other”). 
Materials 
Attitudinal Manipulation. Dependent upon condition, participants read one of four 
vignettes; one discussing the superiority of science, one discussing the superiority of 
religion, one discussing science and religion as compatible belief systems, and one 
control vignette discussing pizza toppings (see Appendix A). These vignettes were 
presented to participants as articles posted on The Washington Post’s website, with each 
article being assigned a pair of authors, each holding a specific title suggesting expertise 
in one of the areas of interest (“Dr.” for the science vignette, “Rev” for the religion 
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vignette, a combination of the two within the mutuality vignette, and no title for the 
control vignette). Additionally, each vignette was counter-balanced with name, to ensure 
that there was no effect of author name on participants’ responses (common male names 
were used). Due to a lack of validated materials for this specific manipulation, I wrote all 
of the conditional vignettes for this study. 
Expertise. Participants indicated the level of expertise they attributed to the 
authors of the vignettes using a single item measure (“What level of expertise would you 
rate the authors of the article as having?”; 1=No Expertise; 7=The Writers are Experts) 
created by myself. 
Belief in Scientific Facts. Participants rated their agreement with 10 empirically 
supported scientific statements (see Appendix B) using a 7-point Likert-type scale (total 
α=0.67; 1=Not at All; 7=Completely). Items were gathered by the authors from various 
sources based on the public availability of the information and were divided into facts 
considered to be uncomfortable (5 items; α=0.64) or comfortable (5 items; α=0.57). Due 
to the low reliability of these fact items, they were averaged to create a measure of 
overall fact endorsement1. One of my previous studies found similarly low reliabilities 
and an exploratory factor analysis (EFA) was run on the fact items, with no meaningful 
factor structure returned (Medlin, Sacco, & Brown, 2019)2. 
 
1 When fact comfortability was included as a within subjects factor, the only effect to emerge was a 
comfortability by religiosity interaction, such higher religiosity predicted less disbelief in comfortable 
compared to uncomfortable facts. As such, this variable is not discussed further. 
2 The EFA yielded two factors explaining about 40.91% of the variance. The first factor included the 
uncomfortable fact items and accounted for approximately 26% of the variance. The second factor included 
the comfortable fact items and accounted for approximately 15% of the variance. KMO was adequate, as 




Religious Respect. Participants also rated their level of respect for general 
religious practices (i.e., praying daily) by completing a 10 item, 4-point Likert-type scale 
(1=Strongly Disagree; 4=Strongly Agree), modified version of the Santa Clara Strength 
of Religious Faith questionnaire (Plante & Boccaccini, 1997). This scale was modified to 
measure participants’ respect for an individual who engages in these religious practices, 
rather than measuring the participants’ own engagement in those practices, since no 
measure of respect for religious practices exists (see Appendix C). To avoid a loss of 
scale reliability, I kept the original anchors and calculated the reliability to compare with 
the Santa Clara itself (modified scale reliability α=0.97; original scale reliability α=0.95). 
Positive and Negative Affect Schedule - Fear and Hostility. Participants were 
asked to rate the number of times in a week that they felt emotions related to fear and 
hostility (e.g., anger, fear) using the fear (6 items; α=0.87) and hostility (6 items; α=0.79) 
subscales of the PANAS-X, using a 5-point Likert-type scale (1=Very Slightly or Not At 
All; 5=Extremely) (total α=0.86; Watson & Lee, 1994) (see Appendix D). 
Belief in Science/Religion. In order to have equivalent measures of belief in 
science and belief in religion, the Belief in Science scale was used (BIS α=0.91; Farias, 
Newheiser, Kahane, & de Toledo, 2013). I modified the science items to create an 
equivalent measure of belief in religion (BIR α=0.95). Participants were asked to indicate 
their level of agreement with the 10 items of the Belief in Science and Belief in Religion 
measures using a 7-point Likert-type scale (1=Strongly Disagree; 7=Strongly Agree) (see 
Appendix E). 
General measure of religiosity. Participants rated their agreement with 5 items 
making up a general religiosity measure using a 7-point Likert-type scale (1=Strongly 
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Disagree; 7=Strongly Agree) (α=0.91; Barnes, Brown, & Osterman, 2012) (see Appendix 
F). 
Political Affiliation. Participants indicated their general political orientation using 
a face-valid, single-item 7-point Likert-type scale measure (1=Very Liberal; 7=Very 
Conservative). Additionally, participants indicated their political orientation regarding 
economic and social issues (fiscal and social political orientation), using two single-item 
measures, each on a 9-point Likert-type scale (1=Very Liberal; 9=Very Conservative) 
(see Appendix G). Previous research demonstrates such single-item measures sufficiently 
assess political affiliation. Given moderate associations between religiosity and political 
conservatism (political affiliation, r(272)=0.49, p<0.001; social conservativism, 
r(272)=0.46, p<0.001; fiscal conservativism, r(272)=0.45, p<0.001,) (e.g., Medlin et al., 
2019), and given the current study’s interest in religiosity more specifically, these three 
political orientation measures were included as covariates in statistical models to isolate 
the independent impact of religiosity. Given that both conceptually and empirically social 
and fiscal conservatism predict different outcomes, these variables were included as 
independent control variables, rather than averaged into a single covariate. 
Procedure 
This study was reviewed and approved by The University of Southern Mississippi 
Institutional Review Board (see Appendix I). The study was then programmed into 
Qualtrics for online data collection. Recruitment occurred through USM’s SONA 
participation system, with the compensation for participation being course credit. After 
obtaining informed consent (Appendix J), participants were randomly assigned into one 
of the four conditions; the condition in which science was discussed as being superior to 
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religion, the condition in which religion was discussed as being superior to science, the 
condition in which science and religion were presented as complementary, with science 
and religion both being described as having valuable, though different, functions, and the 
control condition.  
Participants were instructed to read the vignette, presented as an opinion article on 
The Washington Post website, carefully, as they would be asked a question about it once 
they finished. They were given two minutes to read the article before being able to move 
forward in the study, to ensure they did not click straight through within reading. Earlier 
testing indicated that this was ample time for participants to fully read and comprehend 
the article. Following this, participants were asked to indicate what they thought the 
article’s authors’ expertise to be before completing all dependent and individual 
differences measures in a randomized order. At the end of the study, participants filled 
out a demographics form and were then redirected to a new window where they were 




CHAPTER III  - RESULTS 
Analyses 
Primary Analyses 
To test core predictions that self-reported religiosity and vignette condition would 
interact to influence acceptance of scientific facts, respect for religion, and general belief 
in science versus religion, independent of political orientation and perceptions of vignette 
author expertise, custom ANCOVAs were utilized, with condition as a between subject 
IV, religiosity as a continuous predictor variable, and expertise, political affiliation, social 
political orientation, and fiscal political orientation as control variables3,4.  Dependent 
variables included overall scientific fact endorsement, respect for religious practices, and 
the equivalent belief in science and belief in religion scales. Custom ANCOVAs allow 
main effect and interaction analyses among combinations of categorical and continuous 
variables, and are similar to regression models. 
Fact Endorsement model. Within the fact endorsement model, a main effect of 
religiosity was found, F(1, 271)=15.185, p<.001, η2=.055. A negative correlation 
indicated that more highly religious individuals were less likely to endorse facts, r(266)=-
0.24, p<0.001, consistent with previous research (Medlin et al., 2019). No additional 
significant effects emerged in this model (ps>.25). 
Respect for Religious Practices model. Within the respect for religious practices 
model, main effects of condition, F(3, 269)=4.563, p=.004, η2=.050, and religiosity, F(1, 
 
3 Political affiliation and social conservativism were found to be related to the dependent variables, while 
fiscal conservativism was unrelated. Social conservativism predicted lower belief in science [r(267)=-.028, 
p=.011] and more conservative political affiliation predicted higher religious respect [r(267)=.173, p=.004]. 
4 The primary findings of this research held in models with and without accounting for expertise and the 
political orientation measures. 
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271)=50.080, p<.001, η2=.162, were found. Contrary to hypotheses, LSD tests indicated 
that there were no significant differences in respect between conditions (ps>.07), though 
there was a marginal difference found between the mutuality and control conditions 
(p=.075). This suggests that individuals within the mutuality condition reported 
marginally higher respect for religious practices than individuals within the control 
condition, providing only weak support for study predictions. Additionally, consistent 
with past research, the main effect of religiosity was such that those higher in religiosity 
reported greater respect of religious practices, r(266)=0.39, p<0.001. Importantly and 
consistent with core study hypotheses, these main effects were subsumed within a 
significant condition by religiosity interaction, F(3, 269) = 3.965, p=.009, ηp
2=.044. 
To decompose the interaction found above, a floodlight analyses was conducted.  
Specifically, data were submitted to Model 1 of PROCESS (Hayes, 2013) using 5000 
bootstraps. Floodlight analyses were used to allow for comparisons of marginal means 
(i.e., the estimated condition means) at different levels of the mediator in each model. In 
this model, condition was the predictor, respect for religious practices was the outcome, 
expertise, political affiliation, social political orientation, and fiscal political orientation 
were covariates, and religiosity was the mediator.  
At low (-1 SD) religiosity, the mutuality condition predicted significantly higher 
levels of respect for religion compared to all other conditions (ps<.043). Consistent with 
hypotheses, this finding suggests that individuals low in religiosity respond positively to 
the idea of science and religion being considered complementary, rather than mutually 
exclusive. At mean religiosity, conditions did not significantly differ on level of respect 
(all ps>.07). At high (+1 SD) religiosity, conditions did not significantly differ in level of 
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respect (all ps>.23). Simple slopes analysis indicated that religiosity predicted increased 
respect in all conditions (science, b=.13, p<.001, religion: b=.14, p<.001; control, b=.18, 
p<.001) except the mutuality condition (p=.259) (see Figure 1). Thus, mutuality disrupts 
the relationship between religiosity and respect for religion specifically by operating on 
the attitudes of those low in self-reported religiosity.  
 
Figure 1. Simple Slopes for Respect floodlight model. 
Simple slopes analysis demonstrating the general increase in respect across different levels of religiosity. 
Belief in Science and Belief in Religion models. Belief in science and belief in 
religion, which were on the same scale, served as separate DVs within a multivariate 
model. Within the belief in science model, a main effect of condition was found, F(3, 
269)=3.362,p=.019, η2=.037. Inconsistent with hypotheses, LSD tests indicated that there 
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were no significant pairwise differences in belief in science between conditions 
(ps>.593). In addition, a main effect of religiosity was found within the belief in science 
model, F(1, 271)=95.184, p<.001, η2=.268. Consistent with previous research, a negative 
correlation indicated that more highly religious individuals reported lower belief in 
science, r(71)=-0.52, p<.001. These results were qualified by a significant condition by 
religiosity interaction, F(3,269)=3.786, p=.011, ηp
2=.042.  This interaction suggests the 
main effect of condition above, which demonstrated no post-hoc conditional level 
differences, was driven by individuals of specific levels of religiosity. 
The interaction above was decomposed using floodlight analysis, with the same 
predictor, covariates, and moderator as in the respect for religious practices floodlight 
model. However, within this model, belief in science was the outcome variable. At low (-
1 SD) religiosity, the religion is superior condition was associated with significantly 
higher levels of belief in science compared to the mutuality condition, b=0.63, SE=0.26, 
t(260)=2.47, p=.014. This finding suggests that, when told that religion is superior to 
science rather than being an equally valid method of understanding the world, individuals 
low in religiosity demonstrate defensive reactance, becoming even more favorably 
predisposed to science, which is consistent with study hypotheses. There was no 
significant difference between the other conditions (ps>.10). At mean religiosity, 
conditions did not significantly differ on level of belief in science (all ps>.59). At high 
(+1 SD) religiosity, conditions did not significantly differ in belief in science (all 
ps>.066). Simple slopes analysis indicated that religiosity predicted decreased belief in 
science in all conditions (science, b=-.36, p<.001, religion: b=-.50, p<.001; mutuality: 




Figure 2. Simple Slopes for Belief in Science floodlight model. 
Simple slopes analysis demonstrating the general decrease in belief in science across different levels of religiosity. 
Belief in Religion. Within the belief in religion model, a main effect of religiosity 
was found, F(1, 271)=177.979, p<.001, η2=.406, with a positive correlation indicating 
that participants higher in religiosity reported higher belief in religion, r(268)=.64, 
p<.001, consistent with hypotheses. No other significant effects emerge within this model 
(all ps>.50). 
Fear and Hostility model. Within the fear and hostility model, no difference 
across conditions was found (ps>.19), nor were there differences in fear or hostility 




CHAPTER IV - DISCUSSION 
Independent of condition, and consistent with past research, religiosity and 
political orientation, both general and social conservatism but not fiscal conservatism, 
predicted less support for science and more belief in religion (Medlin et al., 2019). The 
mutuality condition led those low in religiosity to have more respect for religion, which 
was consistent with hypotheses. When individuals reporting lower religiosity were told 
that religion is superior compared to religion and science being equal, they reported 
greater belief in science (predicted reactance), also supporting hypotheses. Consistent 
with this latter finding, previous research, demonstrates that a lack of compromise tends 
to result in one party reacting negatively against the party enforcing the non-negotiable 
decision, even when there are no personal consequences for the person having the 
decision made for them (doctor-patient study; Steindl & Jonas, 2015). This suggests that 
the commonly seen inter-party political arguing may be more a result of the non-
compromising attitude of the other side, rather than incongruous values, which further 
suggests that the negative feelings between the two parties could be assuaged using a 
mutualistic framework.  
While low-religious individuals displayed the predicted defensive reactivity 
within the religion as superior condition when compared to the mutuality condition, the 
level of belief in science in the mutuality condition was the lowest out of all conditions. 
Though this difference is only descriptive, it would be beneficial to design future studies 
to manipulate mutuality in such a way that while respect is increased in individuals 




As mutuality descriptively decreased belief in science in low-religious 
individuals, it did not make more highly religious persons more accepting of scientific 
facts or make them believe in science more, contrary to hypotheses. Additionally, while 
higher religiosity did predict both lower belief in science and lower fact endorsement, 
these findings were not restricted to the science condition, as was predicted, but were 
shown in all conditions. This finding demonstrates a general dismissal of science by 
highly religious individuals, rather than reactive dismissal by religious participants due to 
provocation, which is also not consistent with hypotheses. This may cause difficulty for 
future attempts at trying to increase religious individuals’ acceptance of and belief in 
science, given that their resistance may be more complex than simple reactionary 
aggression towards antagonistic presentation of scientific information, and may also 
include moral objections to scientific research (Bainbridge, 2003; McPhetres & 
Zuckerman, 2018; Nisbet, 2005). This idea seems partially supported by the current 
study, as religiosity predicted less acceptance of uncomfortable relative to comfortable 
facts, though type of fact did not interact with the mutuality condition. 
More religious person’s cognitive inflexibility could explain resistance to 
mutualism documented in the current study. Given that viewing science and religion as 
equally valuable ways of knowing is cognitively inconsistent with more religious 
persons’ personally held view that religion is superior, and given religious individuals’ 
greater cognitive inflexibility in general, they may not be willing to cognitively engage 
this alternative point of view which runs counter to their existing strongly held beliefs 
(Zmigrod, Rentfrow, Zmigrod & Robbins, 2019).  Given then that more religious 
individuals’ attitudes towards science appear to be more nuanced, it might be possible to 
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increase religious individuals’ acceptance of science that does not go against religious 
moralities (e.g., medical research not involving stem cells or cloning). 
The results of this study show that individuals reporting lower levels of religiosity 
appear to be moved by mutuality, while highly religious individuals seem unresponsive 
to the current study’s manipulation. This could be due in part to the fact that individuals 
reporting lower religiosity are more likely to be politically liberal, and therefore, more 
open to different experiences (Carney, Jost, Gosling, & Potter, 2008; Rutjens, Sutton, & 
van der Lee, 2018), thereby making it more likely that they would also be more open to 
different perspectives. 
With regards to fear and hostility, the manipulations did not influence measured 
state affect, and thus the results seem to not be driven by changes in affect. This finding 
is interesting, because it suggests that provoking people by invalidating a valued 
worldview does not make them respond with greater affective hostility, but rather results 
in defensive support for their own worldview, which may then make compromise 
between the groups easier than previously expected. This assumption is based on the 
neuro-evolutionary relation between reactive aggression and reduced cortical-subcortical 
communication, resulting in failure to inhibit uncontrolled socially violent behaviors by 
the relevant cortical regions (van Honk, Harmon-Jones, Morgan, & Schutter, 2010). If 
these individuals are unable to control aggressive tendencies when confronted with 
socially threatening information (worldview threat), any discussion regarding the 




Importantly, the core findings of this research held in models both accounting for 
and not accounting for expertise and the political orientation measures, further suggesting 
that effects of mutuality exist independent of expertise and political orientation. This 
suggests that mutuality is indeed an effective method to reduce animosity between two 
conflicting groups, if not improve the relationship between them, regardless of 
perceptions of expertise or personal political orientation.  
Limitations and Future Directions 
Given the use of a preselected sample of university students, all from the 
Southeastern United States, a highly religious region. The results may have been 
influenced by participants with higher average levels of religiosity compared to other 
regions within the US. Future research would benefit from recruiting nationwide, to 
obtain a sample that better represents religiosity levels across the country. Additionally, 
other regions may contain more variability in religious beliefs, making it possible that the 
manipulation may be more impactful in these more varied areas. Alternatively, it is 
possible that religiosity type (i.e., intrinsic versus extrinsic) may make a difference, 
where individuals reporting more intrinsic religiosity may show more support for 
scientific research than those reporting more extrinsic religiosity, due to the positive 
relation between intrinsic religiosity and openness to experience (Saroglou, 2002). 
Another possible area of religious variation may come from people who have a literal 
versus historical-critical interpretation of the bible. Individuals reporting a more literal 
interpretation may be less likely to support science, due to a negative relation between 
scriptural literalism and science knowledge (Zigerell, 2010). 
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In addition, our sample was comprised entirely of undergraduate college students. 
I would expect that individuals with a higher level of education, such as masters’ and 
doctoral students, would display stronger reactance when put in the condition counter to 
their area of study (e.g., a PhD in biological sciences in the religion condition) (Barone,  
Petto, & Campbell, 2014). As these individuals would be much more familiar with the 
field than would undergraduates in the same area, I would expect that they would respond 
more aggressively when being told that their area of expertise is inferior to another mode 
of thinking. Therefore, further research could benefit from considering how differing 
educational experiences, on top of other sociodemographic factors, could influence 
individuals’ acceptance of science and respect for religious practices. 
While the mutuality condition did show some of the hypothesized positive 
changes in fact endorsement and religious respect, its effects were not as strong as 
expected. Future research should examine methods to improve the effectiveness of 
mutuality exposure in such a way that individuals reporting higher levels of religiosity 
demonstrate increased fact endorsement and belief in science. This could be 
accomplished by utilizing mutualistic communication to make scientific research more 
salient to religious individuals, perhaps by referencing how improved medical technology 
is able to help more people faster, appealing to the aspect of religiosity focused on 
helping others in need.  
The intention of the study was to explore the possibility of developing an 
intervention aimed at increasing respect for religion as well as acceptance of empirically 
supported scientific information utilizing mutualistic communication. While mutuality 
was found to be partially effective, the current study was limited in the fact that it was 
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cross-sectional.  Thus, it is yet unknown if the manipulations in the current study could 
be leveraged to produce meaningful changes in respect for religion and belief in science 
that would be indicative of an effective intervention.  Future research would benefit from 
a pre-post or longitudinal design to assess the utility of the current epistemological 
framings as an attitudinal intervention. 
Additionally, the lack of an actual mutuality measure with the ability to assess 
participants’ attitudes regarding the compatibility of religion and science was a notable 
limitation of this study. Due to the limited literature discussing the utility of mutuality 
outside of a therapeutic setting, such a measure does not yet seem to have been 
developed. Such a measure would advance research on improving relations between 
religious and non-religious persons by providing a method of assessing individual 
perceptions of group compatibility, facilitating a deeper analysis of mutuality’s impact on 
religious respect and scientific belief. 
Another option could involve manipulating mutuality to show specific examples 
of how science has helped religion, by showing that community-support from religion is 
good for overall health and how religion has actually helped influencing science. For 
example, the Hippocratic Oath that medical doctors take to ensure they help everyone 
regardless of background is an example of how religious and spiritual philosophical 
traditions have positively influenced science (Jotterand, 2005). By making mutuality 
more concrete and demonstrating how religion has positively influenced important 
aspects of science, people might be more likely to see science and religion as 




Additionally, may be that more highly religious individuals would respond to 
science more positively if they saw their religious leaders promoting scientific 
acceptance. Individuals reporting higher levels of religiosity have been long known to 
engage in authoritarianism; the enforcement of obedience to authority at the cost of 
individual freedoms (e.g., Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950). If 
highly religious individuals were to see their pastors, elders, or deacons promote 
scientific knowledge, they may be more likely to also embrace science, given past 
research showing group membership similarity between a communicator and their 
audience is more effective at promoting audience attitude changed relative to group 
membership dissimilarity (Mills & Jellison, 1968). 
Conclusion 
The current study sought to compare how mutually exclusive articulations of 
science and religion versus a mutualist articulation of science and religion as 
complementary ways of knowing influence acceptance of scientific facts and respect for 
religious beliefs. Consistent with previous research, more religious individuals reported 
overall lower endorsement of scientific facts. When testing levels of religious respect, 
more conservative individuals, as well as those reporting higher levels of religiosity, 
reported higher overall levels of respect for religious practices. Participants low in 
religiosity within the mutuality condition reported greater respect for religious practices 
compared to all other conditions. Additionally, low religiosity individuals exposed to the 
religion-superiority condition expressed greater belief in science compared to the 
mutuality condition. These results highlight mutuality as an effective strategy to increase 
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secular individuals’ respect for religion; however, high religiosity persons are un-swayed 










APPENDIX B - Informed Consent 
 
Informed Consent to Participate in a Research Project 
Project Information 
Project Title: Mutuality as a bridge between religion and science 
Investigators: Mary Medlin, MS, Don Sacco, Ph.D. 
Contact Information: Participants may contact Mary Medlin, MS, in the Department of 
Psychology at the University of Southern Mississippi, or Don Sacco 
(donald.sacco@usm.edu). 
Purpose of Study 
You are invited to take part in a research study conducted by Mary Medlin (advisor: Dr. 
Don Sacco) in the Department of Psychology.  Any questions or concerns regarding this 
research may be directed to Dr. Sacco (Owings-McQuagge Hall; Room 220F; 601-266-
6747; Donald.sacco@usm.edu).  This project and this consent form have been reviewed 
by the Institutional Review Board, which ensures that research projects involving human 
participants follow federal regulations. Any questions or concerns about your rights as a 
research participant should be directed to the Chair of the Institutional Review Board, 
The University of Southern Mississippi, Box 5116, Hattiesburg, MS 39406, (601) 266-
5997.  
Description of Study 
In this study you will be asked to review an essay as well as fill out some attitudinal 
surveys. Additionally, you will be asked to provide some basic demographic information. 




Your participation in this study does not guarantee any beneficial results.  However, it 
will aid in your understanding of how psychological research is conducted as well as 
contribute to the general knowledge in the field. 
Risks 
The risks associated with participation in this study are not greater than those ordinarily 
encountered in daily life, although you may feel mild emotional discomfort in various 
stages of the experiment. If you feel that you are distressed at any time while 
participating in this research, you should notify the researcher immediately. Furthermore, 
for questions regarding topics of a sensitive nature, you can choose to skip those 
questions and it will not impact your compensation for participating in this study. 
Confidentiality 
The responses that you provide today will be kept completely confidential.  At no time 
will your name or any other identifying information be associated with any of the data 
that you generate today.  It will never be possible to identify you personally in any report 
of this research.  Within these restrictions, results of the study will be made available to 
you upon request. 
Alternative Procedures 
You are free to discontinue your participation in this study at any time without penalty or 
loss of benefits.  You may also freely decline to answer any of the questions asked of 
you. 
Participant's Assurance 
This project has been reviewed by the Institutional Review Board, which ensures that 
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research projects involving human subjects follow federal regulations. 
Any questions of concerns about rights as a research participant should be directed to the 
Chair of the IRB at 601-266-5997. Participation in this project is completely voluntary, 
and participants may withdraw from this study at any time without penalty, prejudice, or 
loss of benefits. 
Any questions about the research should be directed to the Principle Investigator using 
the contact information provided in the Project Information section above. 
Consent to Participate 
Consent is hereby given to participate in this research project. All procedures and/or 
investigations to be followed and their purpose, including any experimental procedures, 
were explained to me. Information was given about all benefits, risks, inconveniences, or 
discomforts that might be expected. 
The opportunity to ask questions regarding the research and procedures was given. 
Participation in the project is completely voluntary, and participants may withdraw at any 
time without penalty, prejudice, or loss of benefits. All personal information is strictly 
confidential, and no names will be disclosed. Any new information that develops during 
the project will be provided if that information mat affect the willingness to continue 
participation in the project. 
Questions concerning the research, at any time during or after the project, should be 
directed to the Principle Investigator with the contact information provided above. This 
project and this consent form have been reviewed by the Institutional Review Board, 
which ensures that research projects involving human subjects follow federal regulations. 
Any questions or concerns about rights as a research participant should be directed to the 
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Chair of the Institutional Review Board, The University of Southern Mississippi, 118 
College Drive #5147, Hattiesburg, MS 39406-0001, (601) 226-5997. 
If you consent to these procedures, please click the button labeled "I consent" below and 
continue. 






























APPENDIX D - Fact Items 
 
1. The brain regenerates brain cells (Martino et al., 2007). C 
2. Humans are responsible for climate change (Hughes et al., 2003). C 
3. Some sea turtles display bioluminescence (They can glow) (Gruber & Sparks, 2015). C 
4. Scientists are now capable of taking pictures of black holes (Loff, 2019). C 
5. Doctors can perform successful face transplants (Barret et al., 2011). C 
6. Humans evolved through natural selection (Darwin, 1859). U 
7. Humans and dinosaurs did not coexist (Cloninger, 2009). U 
8. The use of human stem cells has been beneficial for society (Onda et al., 2008). U 
9. Prophesies and divine communication are symptoms of schizophrenia (Murray, 
Cunningham, & Price). U 
10. Human behavior is driven by evolved basic needs, not free will (Darwin, 1859). U 
________________________________________________________________________ 





APPENDIX E - Respect for Religious Practices 
 
Santa Clara Strength of Religious Faith Questionnaire - Modified 
Please answer the following questions about religious practices using the scale below.  
Indicate your agreement with the following statements. 
1 = strongly disagree 2 = disagree 3 = agree 4 =strongly agree 
 
1. I respect people whose religious faith is important to them. 
2. I respect people who pray daily. 
3. I respect people who look to their faith as a source of inspiration. 
4. I respect people who look to their faith as providing meaning and purpose in their life. 
5. I respect people who consider themselves active in their faith or church. 
6. I respect people for whom faith is an important part of who they are as a person. 
7. I respect people for whom a relationship with God is extremely important to them. 
8. I respect people who enjoy being around others who share their faith. 
9. I respect people who look to their faith as a source of comfort. 
10. I respect people whose faith impacts many of their decisions
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APPENDIX F - PANAS-X 
 
PANAS - fear and hostility subscales 
This scale consists of a number of words and phrases that describe different feelings and 
emotions. Read each item and then mark the appropriate answer in the space next to that 
word. Indicate to what extent you have felt this way during the past few weeks. Use the 
following scale to record your answers: 
 1   2   3   4   5 
very slightly           a little           moderately        quite a bit        extremely 
or not at all 
 
______ Afraid  ______ Scared  ______ Frightened  ______ Nervous 
______ Disgusted  ______ Jittery  ______ Shaky  ______ Angry 




APPENDIX G - Belief in Science & Religion 
Belief in science scale 
1. Science provides us with a better understanding of the universe than does 
religion. 
2. In a demon-haunted world, science is a candle in the dark.  
3. We can only rationally believe in what is scientifically provable. 
4. Science tells us everything there is to know about what reality consists of. 
5. All the tasks human beings face are soluble by science. 
6. The scientific method is the only reliable path to knowledge. 
7. The only real kind of knowledge we can have is scientific knowledge.  
8. Science is the most valuable part of human culture. 
9. Science is the most efficient means of attaining truth. 
10. Scientists and science should be given more respect in modern society. 
 
Belief in religion scale 
1. Religion provides us with a better understanding of the universe than does 
science. 
2. In a demon-haunted world, religion is a candle in the dark.  
3. We can only rationally believe in what is said in religious texts. 
4. Religion tells us everything there is to know about what reality consists of. 
5. All the tasks human beings face are soluble by religion. 
6. Faith is the only reliable path to knowledge. 
7. The only real kind of knowledge we can have is religious knowledge.  
8. Religion is the most valuable part of human culture. 
9. Religion is the most efficient means of attaining truth. 
10. Spiritual leaders and religious belief should be given more respect in 
modern society. 




APPENDIX H - General Measure of Religiosity 
 
Items 
I consider myself to be a religious person 
I consider myself to be a spiritual person 
I am not religious (reverse scored) 
I am a member of an organized religion 
I regularly attend religious services 
_______________________________________________________________________________ 








APPENDIX I - Political Affiliation Items 
 
1. Specifically with regard to economic issues, and setting social issues aside, how would 
you describe your political orientation?  
 9-point Likert-type scale (1=Very Liberal; 9=Very Conservative) 
 
2. Specifically with regard to social issues, and setting economic issues aside, how would 
you describe your political orientation? 
 9-point Likert-type scale (1=Very Liberal; 9=Very Conservative) 
 
3. What is your political affiliation? 
7-point Likert-type scale (1=Very Liberal; 7=Very Conservative)
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APPENDIX J - Debriefing 
 
Thank you for participating in this experiment! We hope you found the task an 
interesting and enjoyable experience. 
In this study, we were interested in whether the manner in which information is 
presented would influence people’s acceptance of that information. Past literature 
suggests that individual differences are related to acceptance of certain types of 
information, as is the method of information presentation (e.g., political orientation; 
Medlin et al., 2019). For example, when exposed to information that is presented in a 
highly biased, maybe even confrontational, manner, individuals will react to it based on 
their own views. If the information is inconsistent with their views, they are more likely 
to react negatively to the information, making it less likely that they will accept it (e.g., 
religious extremists’ violent dismissal of scientific research). In fact, these individuals 
will double down on their own view and dismiss anything that threatens it 
(Lewandowsky et al., 2016; McGregor, Zanna, Holmes, & Spencer, 2001). Based on this 
defensive reaction, we hypothesized that information presented in a complimentary light 
(e.g., that science and religion are both valuable) would reduce this reactivity and foster 
increased mutual acceptance in both the scientific and religious camps. 
Due to the on-going nature of this research, we would like to ask for your 
cooperation in not revealing any details of this study to others (e.g. friends, classmates) 
who might eventually participate in this study. These details could affect the way they 
perform in this experiment, which would adversely affect the nature of our study. If 
someone does ask, you can just tell them that you were asked to participate in a study 
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about social attitudes, rather than providing specific details about the study. We did not 
expect you to feel a great amount of discomfort in this study but the chance of feeling 
that way was possible. If you felt any distress while writing about a time in your life, you 
may benefit from counseling. Contact your health care provider for local mental health 
agencies that may be able to help you. 
If any part of this experiment has been traumatic for you in any way, please feel 
free to inform the experimenter. If you have further questions, please contact the 
experimenter listed on your consent form (Mary Medlin, ABD, mary.medlin@usm.edu). 
Should you be interested in reading research related to this work, you can get 
more information from: 
 Medlin, M. M., Sacco, D. F., & Brown, M. (2019). Political Orientation and Belief in 
Science in a US College Sample. Psychological Reports, 0033294119889583. 
 Lewandowsky, S., Mann, M. E., Brown, N. J. L., & Friedman, H. (2016). Science and the 
public: Debate, denial, and skepticism. Journal of Social and Political 
Psychology, 4(2), 537–553. doi: 10.5964/jspp.v4i2.604 
 Kruglanski, A. W., Webster, D. M., & Klem, A. (1993). Motivated resistance and 
openness to persuasion in the presence or absence of prior information. Journal of 






APPENDIX K - Descriptives Table 
 
Table 1. Descriptives Table.
Condition Statistic Std. Error Statistic Std. Error
Science 75 3.50 1.00 4.50 2.3400 0.94933 0.511 0.277 -0.434 0.548
Religion 66 3.00 1.00 4.00 2.1086 0.81728 0.292 0.295 -1.088 0.582
Mutuality 64 4.00 1.00 5.00 2.2031 0.97837 0.629 0.299 -0.319 0.590
Control 67 3.80 1.00 4.80 2.4015 0.98802 0.416 0.293 -0.529 0.578
Science 75 3.17 1.00 4.17 1.9711 0.75555 0.951 0.277 0.388 0.548
Religion 66 2.17 1.00 3.17 1.7475 0.59502 0.775 0.295 -0.481 0.582
Mutuality 64 2.33 1.00 3.33 1.7057 0.67504 0.793 0.299 -0.305 0.590
Control 67 2.33 1.00 3.33 1.7985 0.65811 0.603 0.293 -0.528 0.578
Science 75 2.20 1.80 4.00 3.5996 0.51850 -1.217 0.277 1.145 0.548
Religion 66 3.00 1.00 4.00 3.5788 0.56610 -2.022 0.295 5.795 0.582
Mutuality 64 1.10 2.90 4.00 3.7484 0.38172 -1.250 0.299 -0.097 0.590
Control 67 1.90 2.10 4.00 3.5746 0.53153 -0.959 0.293 -0.235 0.578
Science 75 4.10 2.40 6.50 4.6093 0.80239 -0.315 0.277 0.146 0.548
Religion 66 4.60 1.90 6.50 4.4106 0.96845 -0.323 0.295 -0.051 0.582
Mutuality 64 4.20 2.60 6.80 4.5594 0.77249 0.013 0.299 1.070 0.590
Control 67 3.90 2.30 6.20 4.4612 0.84279 -0.251 0.293 0.041 0.578
Science 75 5.00 1.20 6.20 3.7704 1.11415 -0.230 0.277 -0.179 0.548
Religion 66 5.70 1.00 6.70 3.8621 1.41245 0.019 0.295 -0.701 0.582
Mutuality 64 4.20 1.40 5.60 3.5938 0.95500 -0.122 0.299 -0.455 0.590
Control 67 5.60 1.30 6.90 3.6866 1.27075 0.073 0.293 -0.614 0.578
Science 75 5.70 1.00 6.70 3.7040 1.43333 0.286 0.277 -0.484 0.548
Religion 66 6.00 1.00 7.00 3.5621 1.67761 0.107 0.295 -0.904 0.582
Mutuality 64 6.00 1.00 7.00 4.2109 1.32067 -0.317 0.299 -0.284 0.590

















































































































* -0.043 -0.113 -0.084





























Belief in Sci. -.646
** -0.079
Belief in Rel. .290
**
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
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